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Durante los días 16 a 23 de febrero del curso académico 2000/2001 y en el
marco del convenio institucional de intercambio Sócrates/Erasmus entre las
Facultades de Derecho de la Universidad de Murcia y la de Osnabrück (R. F. de
Alemania) el joven profesor de ésta última Tonio GAS, entre otras actividades
docentes y de atención a nuestros alumnos, impartió la presente Conferencia sobre
el nuevo régimen constitucional de Sudáfrica cuya Ley Fundamental representa un
enorme esfuerzo para superar la actual división de la sociedad y para consolidar un
régimen democrático y respetuoso con los derechos humanos. Es cierto que, en ella,
confluyen distintas y aún opuestas tendencias y que, en determinadas materias,
podrá ser difícilmente llevada a la práctica pero, en cualquier caso, representa una
voluntad constitucional innovadora que comienza a ser conocida, e incluso imitada,
en otros ordenamientos.
Constituye por tanto una satisfacción, como tutor de dicho convenio
institucional, presentar las reflexiones del investigador Tonio GAS que forman parte
de su memoria de tesis doctoral “Affirmative Action in Südafrika unter
Berücksichtigung verfassungsvergleichender Bezüge” dirigida por el Catedrático de
Derecho Público de la Universidad de Osnabrück, Prof. Dr. Albrecht WEBER.
INTRODUCTION
Dealing with the South African Constitution for a quite a long time, I had seen
the fruitful influence of constitutions of all around the world, but preparing this
lecture, I unfortunately had to learn that the Spanish Constitution is one reference
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is never made to. This seems quite astonishing, for Spain, as South Africa, had to
undertake a quick transformation from a dictatorial regime to democracy (which, of
course, is also true for Germany, the constitution of which proves to be of
significant importance for South Africa). Although I unfortunately cannot provide
you with any bridge between the Spanish and the South African Constitution, the
common experience of the two countries may be illustrated by an anecdote,
reported by former President FW De Klerk in his autobiography. Visiting several
european states in 1990 in order to break out the grip of isolation, he reports the
following from Spain:
“Prime Minister Gonzales of Spain provided me with a useful insight into the
thought process of revolutionary organizations, which greatly helped me throughout
the negotiations. With his own background and experience of resistance, he warned
me that I should prepare myself for a great deal of mass action and protest during
the negotiations with the ANC. I should also expect that they would say one thing
at the negotiating table one day, and something completely contradictory the next
day in public. His explanation was that resistance organizations felt that this was the
only countermeasure they could use to keep in the playing fields even when
confronted with the power of the state.”
What was happened that could lead Gonzales and De Klerk to speak of
“negotiations” and what had to be negotiated? In order to understand the constitution-
making process in South Africa, one has to go a little bit more back to the historical
circumstances preceding what is often called a “negotiated revolution”. 
It is difficult to determine when the negotiating process began. In his book
“Tomorrow is another Country”, the South African journalist Allister Sparks reveals
that since 1985, secret meetings between representatives of the Government and the
then banned and exiled ANC took place, i.e. at a time when President PW Botha
was still in power. 
As far as human rights movements are concerned, one has of course to go far
more back. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS BEFORE THE OFFICIAL
NEGOTIATING PROCESS
1. THE FREEDOM CHARTER (1955)
The first important document influencing the constitutional negotiation is the
Freedom Charter, published in 1955. Although the ANC had a leading role in
drafting the Charter, it was not the only organization responsible for it. The Charter
was adopted by a “Congress of the People”, consisting of the ANC, the Indian
Congress, the Coloured People’s Congress, the (white!) Congress of Democrats and
the South African Congress of Trade Unions. Its influence may still be seen in the
final constitution.
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What makes the Charter so important is that it was already written in a spirit
of compromise and reconciliation. Although being largely influenced by a
liberation movement being frequently accused to promulgate marxist ideas, it states
not only “that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white” (my
emphasis), but it also contains a remarkable compromise between communist and
liberal ideology. Although a provision for nationalisation was deemed to be
necessary to overcome white economic domination (“The mineral wealth beneath
the soil, the Banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of
the people as a whole”), the Charter also contains the right to equal opportunity as
well as other classical 1st generation rights such as the right to free economic
activity (“All people shall have equal rights to trade where they choose, to
manufacture and to enter all trades, crafts and professions”). 
To give two examples for the influence of the Freedom Charter on the Final
Constitution (FC), not only states the preamble of the latter that “South Africa
belongs to all who live in it”, but also contains some of the so-called 2nd generation
rights such as the right to basic education (sec. 29 FC) and basic health care (sec.
27 FC), which can already be found in the freedom charter.
2. OTHER DOCUMENTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Human rights movements are not only to be found within the illegal liberation
movements such as the ANC and his allies. In 1960, an expert group published the
so-called Molteno Report, named after his chairman. This document emerges from
the “legal” white opposition at the time, represented by the Progressive Party which
also rejected apartheid, but opted for a liberal solution in the original sense of the
word, i.e. focused primarily on individual, 1st generation rights and the power of a
free market. Later, I will return to the question whether liberal or liberationist
ideologies dominate the South African Bill of Rights and its interpretation.
Since the end of the seventies, the Human Rights discussion also came to the
academics. Conferences were organised at the Universities of Cape Town and
Pretoria, which are difficult to characterise because of a vast plurality of opinions.
It is interesting to see that it was possible to hold these conferences and to express
opinions sometimes fundamentally criticising the apartheid regime. However, the
author of the book “Human Rights and the South African Legal Order” (1978),
Prof. John Dugard told me that his deep analysis of the legal apartheid system and
its incompatibility with any internationally accepted conception of human rights
was threatened to be censored and that the foreword of the “banned” advocate and
ANC activist Albie Sachs (now Constitutional Court Justice) finally was forbidden
to be included into the book.
At the end of the 80s, not only did the ANC present a document called
“Constitutional Guidelines for a democratic South Africa”. It seems even more
remarkable that some years ago, the South African Law Commission, a
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governmental organisation, was mandated by a representative of the apartheid
regime, the minister of justice Coetsee, to elaborate propositions for an inclusion of
human rights in the South African Constitution. Although clearly not dedicated to
abolish apartheid, but only to reform it (what in the opinion of many and especially
the liberation movements such as the ANC was an absurdity), the first interim
report (published in 1989) revealed an open discussion of the various concepts of
human rights. The Law Commission presented another interim report in 1991 and
a final report in 1994, which were important discussion documents in the
negotiation of bout the interim and the final Constitution.
Although the role of the ANC was the dominant one in the negotiating process,
this historical overview shows that the influence of other forces and even of the
government may not be neglected. 
However, it was not before 1990 that open negotiations could take place, and
for one time, it may be clearly said that this is essentially due to one historical event:
President FW De Klerk’s speech at the opening of parliament on 2 February 1990. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS AND SELECTED ISSUES
1. THE FEASIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS
Why was the speech by De Klerk so important? It is precisely because of his
recognition that Apartheid cannot be reformed. It is quite clear that De Klerk was
aware of announcing the beginning of the end of the old regime and thereby of his
own presidency. Allister Sparks remembers that when the text of the speech was
briefed to the press only 30 minutes before its holding, he and his colleagues were
completely confused and he murmured to one of them: “Oh my God, he has done
it all.”
To “have done it all” meant that De Klerk announced not only the
unconditioned release of Nelson Mandela, but also the unbanning of the ANC, the
SACP (South African Communist Party) and other organisations, the release of a
further category of ANC prisoners and the lifting of the State of Emergency
regulations affecting the media and education. The statement also contained a
commitment to “the recognition and protection of the fundamental individual rights
which form the constitutional basis of most Western democracies” and to the
necessity of all-inclusive constitutional negotiations. This clearly acknowledged
that a fundamental political and constitutional change had to take place. The doors
for open negotiations were opened.
2. NEGOTIATING THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION (IC)
It was clear that a newly created constitution should be a document of
consensus and compromise, not of majoritarian domination (although it was clear
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that forthcoming elections would give the ANC a stable majority). Therefore, the
negotiations were aimed to include as much political and social groups as possible.
In order to achieve this, the Convention for a democratic South Africa (CODESA)
was created in 1991. Its first plenary session was attended by nineteen political
groups such as the Government, the ANC, the SACP, the opposition parties
represented in Parliament. Although the negotiations failed because of too great
disparities, the declaration of intent, adopted at the first session, contained some
principles which were foundational for both the interim and the final constitution.
An important example is the supremacy of the constitution as opposed to the
parliamentary sovereignty as imported from Westminster.
When, after a period of stagnation and political violence in 1992, the
negotiations were resumed in 1993, the principle of inclusiveness was not
abolished, but the two most powerful negotiating parties, the ANC and the NP
(National Party) - Government tried to have a better preparation and to reach
agreement on several issues by many previous bilateral meetings. It was also argued
that transparency had to be improved. The new negotiating platform was
deliberately not called CODESA once more, but Multi-party Negotiating Process
(MPNP).
The essential work was done in the Commission for the Demarcation of
Provinces and in the seven technical committees. The latter continuously elaborated
drafting reports and submitted them to the Negotiating Council. Note that it was not
only the task to elaborate a new Constitution, but also to guarantee that free and fair
elections might be held under the old regime, which might explain some of the
Committees tasks such as the repeal of discriminatory legislation and the guarantee
of independent media. All the laws providing for free and fair elections had to be
enacted by the old parliament! This means that the coming into force of the interim
Constitution is not the starting point of the South African Democracy. But I would
like now to focus on the most important constitutional issues.
3. THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION
After tough and controversial negotiations, accompaigned by political
violence, a Constitution was adopted at the end of 1993 and the date of the first free
elections was fixed on April 27th in the forthcoming year (on the same day, the
Constitution came into force). There are, in my opinion, three very important
characteristics which illustrate the compromise between different political and
constitutional conceptions.
A)  CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY:  INTERIM CONSTITUTION,  FINAL CONSTITUTION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
It was soon beyond discussion that the 1993 Constitution could only be a
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transitional document, making way for the elaboration and adoption of a final
constitution. Remember that, even if based on inclusive negotiations, the IC was
adopted by the old apartheid parliament and therefore suffered from a lack of
legitimacy by the people as a whole. The question was whether the final
constitution should be elaborated by a Constitutional Assembly, emerging from the
1994 election results, or whether this should again be done by a multi-party body.
As it was clear, that the ANC would obtain a stable majority, it was feared that it
would dominate a Constitutional Assembly and that majoritarian rule would lead to
a pure “ANC Constitution” instead of a Constitution of the people as a whole. A
multi-party body would have been more inclusive, but would have suffered once
again from a lack of representativity and therefore have undermined the final
constitution’s legitimacy. 
The solution for this dilemma was, once again, a compromise: Although a
Constitutional Assembly would be installed after the elections in order to draft the
final constitution, this assembly was not completely free, but 34 Constitutional
Principles were fixed to be binding even for the final constitution. Moreover, the
newly created Constitutional Court had to state positively on the compliance of the
final constitution with the 34 principles before it could come into force. So the final
constitution, although elaborated by a democratically elected body, was bound to
some extent by general principles which were established by a non-elected multi-
party bode and adopted by an apartheid parliament.
I will later return to the content of the principles when I shall speak about the
Final Constitution, because the required Constitutional Court certification was
denied and the FC had to be amended in order to comply with the Constitutional
Principles. But let me first turn to some other important characteristics of the
Interim Constitution.
B) FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
AA) SCOPE
Both the Interim and the Final Constitution are said to be among the most
liberal and modern in the world. This is true insofar that they contain a vast
catalogue of fundamental rights, called the Bill of Rights. Some of them are very
detailed, such as sec. 25 IC on the rights of detained, arrested and accused persons,
particularly because of the violation of these rights by the apartheid regime. Notice
has also be taken of the fact that the Bill of Rights goes beyond the classical liberal
1st generation rights, but that it also contains some 2nd generation rights, such as
the right to basic education (sec. 32 [a] IC) and the right of children to basic
nutrition, basic health and social services (sec. 30 [1] [c] IC). Although the Final
Constitution is even more progressive in that sense, it is clear that the IC departs
from the classical “nightwatch” liberalism and favours a limited interventionist role
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of the state. This may for example be illustrated by the equality provisions. Not only
is equality the first fundamental right to be found in the Bill of Rights, but it is also
clear that the Constitution commits to a notion of substantive equality, i.e. goes
beyond formal equality in the form of identical treatment without regard to the
political and social circumstances of the formerly disfavoured and the effects of
societal, sometimes unintentional discrimination. This clearly emerges from an
affirmative action clause (sec. 8 [3] [a] IC) which states that “This section (the
equality clause) shall not preclude measures designed to achieve the adequate
protection and advancement of persons or groups or categories of persons
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination in order to enable their full and equal
enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.” The same commitment may be seen in the
Constitutional Principles, e.g. in CP I which states that “The (final) Constitution of
South Africa shall provide for ... a democratic system of government committed to
achieving equality between men and women and people of all races” (my
emphasis).
BB) SOURCES
Furthermore, it is important to realize that the Negotiators could and did
benefit from the experience of countries of all around the world as well as of
international organisations. To give an example, the above-mentioned affirmative
action clause is quite close to sec. 1 (4) of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which states the following:
“Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain
racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order
to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and
fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that
such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for
different racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they
were taken have been achieved.“
For further similarities to international documents, compare for example sec.
11 (2) IC to sec. 3 ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights) and –in the
Final Constitution– sec. 31 to sec. 27 ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights) (see annexure)
The most influential national constitutional documents were the German Basic
Law (GBL) and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and there are many
provisions, especially within the Bill of Rights, which come close to their german
or canadian counterparts. For example, the south african equality clause (sec. 8 IC)
is clearly influenced by both the german and the canadian equality clause. The
wording comes quite closer to sec. 15 CCRF than to the GBL, but some
commentators see a significant difference in the fact that in South Africa, the
general equality provision in sec. 8 (1) IC is separated from the prohibition of
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discrimination in sec. 8 (2) IC, which is not the case in Canada, but also in sec. 3
GBL.
As many german constitutional experts have worked as advisors in the
negotiating process, not only some provisions come quite close to their german
counterparts, but also some fundamental principles which in Germany have been
developed by the courts and academics have been expressly adopted. So, the
german theory of Drittwirkung, which means indirect horizontal application of the
Bill of Rights, is not expressly contained in the GBL, but has become a widely
accepted theory on how to deal with fundamental rights in the private sphere. In
order to explain what Drittwirkung means, you need only to read sec. 35 IC which
is an express adoption of the german model: 
“In the interpretation of any law and the application and development of the common law
and customary law, a court shall have due regard to the spirit, purport and object of this
chapter.” (i.e. the Bill of Rights)
That means that fundamental rights primarily bind the state and its organs and
not private individuals, but may serve as interpretative guide for the application of
law affecting private relationships and therefore bind private individuals in an
indirect manner.
Foreign constitutional and international law did not only influence the making
of the constitution, but this influence also continues with regard to constitutional
interpretation. This is expressly stated by sec. 35 (1) IC which reads as follows:
“In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter (i.e. the Bill of Rights) a court of law shall
promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and
equality and shall, where applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the
protection of the rights entrenched in this Chapter, and may have due regard to comparable
foreign case law.”
The Constitutional Court has frequently made use of this possibility, and
especially in the early judgements, when South African precedent cases on human
rights issues could not be found, the Court had considerable regard to both foreign
and international law and you will find detailed and deep analyses of human rights
issues with regard to a large number of countries and international organisations /
treaties. (I personally could benefit from some of the CC judgements for preparing
my lecture in introduction to the GBL because they sometimes contain very good
treatments of german constitutional law in English language.)
C) FEDERALISM
South Africa is a heterogeneous and multi-ethnic country. According to the
latest statistics (1996 census), its population is composed of 10.9 % whites, 76.7 %
Africans (blacks), 2.6 % Asians (the most of them being Indians) and 8.9 %
“Coloureds”, a mixed race, descendants from the Cape’s indigenous people, black
slaves from the country’s interior and the first white Dutch settlers. However, the
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breakdown by regions is much different from this: The Cape region is still
dominated by the Coloureds whereas the large majority of the Zulu are to be found
in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, the only region where they constitute a vast
majority within the black community. The Whites are over-represented in the Cape
Region and in the Province of Gauteng, where Johannesburg and Pretoria are
located. 
Considering this, it is easy to understand why the question of the vertical
separation of powers was of political importance and very controversially
discussed. The ANC opted in favour of a more centralised system which would
secure him the maximum of power and control, whereas the white and coloured
interest groups, but also the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), headed by Zulu Chief
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, favoured a federal system with much power given to
provinces and local entities which would give them the opportunity to strengthen
their influence by ruling some of them. 
The above-mentioned Commission for the Demarcation of Provinces was
appointed in 1993 in order to investigate and propose a regional demarcation
commission to investigate and propose a regional demarcation to be regulated by
the IC. The commission was provided with a set of criteria, which it then classified
into four broad groups, namely economic aspects, geographic coherence,
institutional and administrative capacity and socio-cultural issues. The result was
the delimitation of nine areas, only two of which correlated with the original
provinces of the Union (Free State and KwaZulu-Natal).
It may be clearly said that South Africa has adopted a federal system, albeit far
from a confederation of independent states. The relationship between the Provinces
and the federal state is defined by a clear delimitation of competences, but there is
also an element of co-operative federalism as the Provinces have their say on the
national level in the Senate as second house of the newly created bicameral
parliament. 
Some of the important constitutional provisions concerning the relationship
between the provinces and the federal state are the following ones:
• section 1 IC, read with schedule 1 IC established “one sovereign state”,
which was however defined in terms of a geographical description of the
nine provinces (similar in sec. 1 / 103 FC, but without explicit reference to
the territory consisting of the nine provinces);
• The key provisions of sections 126, 144 (2) and Schedule 6 (IC) allocated
significant original legislative and executive powers to provincial
governments. Section 126 conferred, in a style reminiscent of federalism,
prevalent (though not exclusive in absolute terms) competence upon the
provincial legislatures in schedule 6, leaving Parliament with overriding
competence only for certain defined purposes (FC: sec 104);
• the Constitution afforded provinces a right to an “equitable share of revenue
collected nationally” (Section 155 (1) IC / sec. 214 FC ), and gave every
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province a seat in the Financial and Fiscal Commission (Section 200 (1) (b)
IC / sec. 222 (1) (b) FC );
• every province was empowered to adopt its own constitution providing for
legislative and executive structures different from those created by the
Constitution (Section 160 IC / sec. 142 FC ); and
• provincial governments were entrusted with functions regarding provincial 
policing (Section 124 pp. IC / 103 pp. FC).
Regarding provincial constitutions, it is significant that until now, only the
Western Cape Province and the Province of KwaZulu-Natal have elaborated a
provincial constitution. These are the only provinces not ruled by the ANC, the first
being ruled by the white opposition parties (before 1999: National Party (ruling
party in the old regime), since 1999: Democratic Party (right-wing liberals)) and the
last by the Inkatha Freedom (Zulu) Party. The necessary CC certification of
compliance with the federal constitution has been denied in the latter case. The CC
said that “KwaZulu-Natal is not an independent state and has no original legislative
or executive powers. The only legislative and executive powers that it has are those
given to it by the Interim Constitution. The major flaw in the KZNC was that it
claimed to give powers to the KwaZulu-Natal legislature and executive above and
beyond those allowed by the Interim Constitution and in doing so its provisions
conflicted with the Interim Constitution.” The case was decided under the IC, but
the principle of compliance with the federal constitution is maintained in the FC. As
KwaZulu-Natal has never tried to submit an amended or a completely new version
of a draft constitution, the Western Cape Constitution is actually the only provincial
constitution into force.
D) GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY (GNU)
It is also significant for the transition from consensus to majoritarian rule that
the first government was one called Government of National Unity. That meant that
also opposition parties had the right to be represented in the Government. Sec. 88
(2) IC declares that “A party holding at least 20 seats (of 400) in the National
Assembly and which has decided to participate in the government of national unity,
shall be entitled to be allocated one or more of the Cabinet portfolios in proportion
to the number of seats held by it in the National Assembly relative to the number of
seats held by the other participating parties.”
After the 1994 elections, that meant that the ANC, the IFP and the NP (ruling
party of the old regime) have been represented in the Government (see table on next
page). In 1996, the NP decided to leave the GNU, because they decided that they
could perform better as opposition party.
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4. THE FINAL CONSTITUTION
A) ELABORATION
The framework for elaborating a final constitution was laid down in the IC.
Apart from what has already been said on the subject, it is important to realize that
a rigid time frame was contained in sec. 73 (1) IC: “The Constitutional Assembly
shall pass the new constitutional text within two years as from the date of the first
sitting of the National Assembly under this Constitution.” As this took place 9 May
1994, this had to be done until 8 May 1996, at 24 h. The protocols of the
Constitutional Assembly (CA) reveal that the negotiations were held “in the shadow
of the clock”. The final vote did not take place before 8 May, and you may read
notices as “Business suspended at 21:50 and resumed at 00:25 on 8 May 1996.
The Constitutional Assembly consisted of the two houses of the newly elected
Parliament, and of course, the plenary sessions were preceded by the work in many
theme committees. In order to highlight transparency, submissions from the public
could be made, but as there were a high number of such submissions (about two
millions), it is not always clear how the expert groups managed to integrate the will
of the people in the negotiations. However, to my mind, it is already of great
importance that the people was well informed on the issues under discussion and
that the making of the Constitution was thus a subject of vivid political interest.
B) CERTIFICATION
As it was previously said, the FC had to obtain a certification of compliance
with the Constitutional Principles by the Constitutional Court. This certification
was originally denied (1st certification judgement) and the FC had to be amended
in order to finally obtain the certification (2nd certification judgement) and to come
into force (at 4 February 1997).
The first certification judgement reveals the problematic issues of the original
draft of the FC. The Court’s ultimate finding was that the constitutional text cannot
be certified as complying fully with the Constitutional Principles. As far as
fundamental rights were concerned, only section 23 failed to comply with the
provisions of CP XXVIII in that the right of individual employers to engage in
collective bargaining is not recognised and protected. 
It would take too long to explain in detail which sections did not comply with
some of the CPs. Therefore, I only want to give some examples:
• Section 74 (Bills amending the Constitution) did not comply with CP XV in
that amendments have to require ‘special procedures involving special
majorities’ and the 2/3 majority of the members of the National Assembly
(sec. 74 (1) new text, non-certified version) did not contain any special
procedure); and CP II in that the fundamental rights, freedoms and civil
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liberties are not ‘entrenched’ (the protection of the Bill of rights was
required to be “stronger” than the protection of other constitutional
provisions, which it was not under the non-certified version),
• Some provisions considering the impartiality and independence of
institutions such as the Public Protector (ombudsman) (sec. 194 / CP
XXIX),
• Sections which impermissibly shielded an ordinary statute from
constitutional review,
• Various provisions in Chapter 7 (local government) in that they did not
provide a “framework for the structures of local government”, in that they
did not provide for “appropriate fiscal powers and functions for local
government” and that they did not provide for “appropriate fiscal powers
and functions for different categories of local government” (CPs XXIV,
XXV and X),
• Some provisions relating to the provinces to the extent that their powers
were “substantially less than under the IC” (CP XVIII.2).
In short words, it may be said that the original version of the new text
• contained a more centralist conception of the state,
• its provisions were not safe enough from majoritarian amendments,
• some institutions generally independent such as the ombudsman were not
immune from governmental influence. 
These three characteristics would of course have helped the majoritarian party
on the federal level, the ANC, to enlarge its power and to get rid of some
constitutional constraints, and the judgement denying certification is in my opinion
merits approval, because it is proof of an independent judiciary which is of crucial
political importance for the stability of a political system in which one group has a
dominant role and one may fear that pluralism is in danger to be undermined (as for
example in other African countries such as Zimbabwe where a liberation movement
acceded to power).
C) IMPORTANT ISSUES
AA) LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCES OF THE PROVINCES AND THE FEDERAL STATE
It may be seen from the (first) certification judgement that once again, the
question of vertical separation of powers was of significant importance. As it could
be feared, the ANC-dominated CA had a more centralist form of state in its mind
and thus weakened the power of the provinces and other local entities in favour of
the federal state. To give an example, I want to focus on the legislative powers of
the Provinces. We have seen the system of “concurrent competences” of the
Provinces and the federal state as set out in sec. 126 IC. Sec. 104 FC (1st version)
was deemed to replace sec. 126 IC. 
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Even though a list of exclusive provincial competences has been newly
introduced (sch 5), the new text contains the same problem which also occurred in
Germany. Considering concurrent legislative powers, there is a presumption of
necessity in terms of sec. 146 (4) which might be difficult to displace, especially
when the enquiry is whether or not the national legislation was necessary for the
maintenance of national security or economic utility. In Germany, the “need for
regulation ... because (of) the maintenance of legal or economic utility, especially
the maintenance of uniformity or living conditions...” (Art. 72 II Nr. 3 GBL before
1994) served as a blanket clause to justify a federal law and thus turning concurrent
legislative powers (to which Art. 72 GBL refers) into de facto exclusive powers of
the federation. 
The same danger occurred in another provision of the Final Constitution (1st
version): an override of provincial by national legislation is made competent in
terms of sec. 146(2)(b), where the national legislation provides for uniformity, inter
alia, by establishing “frameworks” or “national policies”. By allowing for national
legislation to prevail over provincial legislation where “the interests of the country
as a whole require” uniformity, and where such uniformity is provided by national
legislation which establishes “norms and standards; frameworks; or national
policies”, the NT has expanded to some extent the grounds on which provincial
legislation can be overridden.
As far as the lists of competences are concerned, the CC noted that the areas
being added to the provincial competences are of far less importance than those
withdrawn from them. However, the conclusion that CP XVIII.2 was violated could
only be torn by considering a multitude of other factors as well.
BB) THE BICAMERAL PARLIAMENT: THE ROLE OF THE NCOP COMPARED TO THE SENATE
In the FC, the former Senate was replaced by a chamber called the National
Council of Provinces (NCOP). The representation of the provinces could even be
strengthened with regard to the Senate, because the NCOP avoids representation of
the political parties instead of the provinces themselves. Under the IC, where
Parliament consists of the NA and the Senate, each province is represented in the
Senate by ten nominated senators. The power to nominate these senators does not
vest in the provincial legislature or its members but in the parties represented in the
provincial legislature. Under the FC, the NCOP consists of delegations of ten
persons appointed by each of the provincial legislatures. Six of the ten are
“permanent” delegates and four are “special” delegates (sec. 60 [1], [2]). The
special delegates, but not the permanent delegates, are to be members of the
provincial legislature (sec. 61 [3]). Each delegation will be led by the Premier of the
province or a member of the provincial legislature designated by the Premier (sec.
60 [3]). A provincial delegation is to be composed in a manner which enables
parties in the provincial legislature to be represented in the delegation
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proportionately to their support in the provincial legislature (sec. 61 [1]). Voting is
by province, each province having one vote, which must be cast in accordance with
the authority conferred on the delegation by the province (sec. 65 [1]).
With that system, the NCOP comes closer to the german Bundesrat than the
Senate, albeit far from being identical.
CC) CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNMENT
In the FC, although power was in some regard shifted from the provincial/local
to the national level, the general concept did not substantially change (but the
transfer of power was nevertheless of such a degree that the certification was
denied). One important notion explicitly introduced in the FC is the notion of co-
operative government. The concept of a co-operative federalism comes very close
to the one underlying the GBL. That means that the different levels of authority
(local / provincial / federal) shall not operate separately in their respective area,
each one totally isolated from the others, but that interaction is not only inevitable,
but in some cases desirable. This is made clear by sec. 40 (1) which describes co-
operative Government not to be stratified necessarily into hierarchical levels, bus as
consisting of “distinctive, interdependent and interrelated” spheres of government.
Sec. 41 entrenches various principles of co-operative government, which, according
to Venter, may be categorised as follows:
• principles emphasising national unity (sec. 41 [1] [a], 41 [1] [h] FC);
• principles defending areas of competence (sec. 41 [1] [e]-[g] FC);
• principles promoting good government and service to the public (sec. 41 [1]
[b]-[d]).
What makes these principles come so close to the German concept is that they
do not contain autonomous duties, but that they have to be read together with other
constitutional provisions. This may be characterised as derivative. To give an
example, the duty to “respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and
functions of government in the other spheres“ (sec. 41 [1] [e] FC) contains nothing
substantial until read together with other constitutional provisions defining what
exactly has to be respected. The same may be said on the german notion of
Bundestreue, although not specifically entrenched in the GBL. But if put together
with a substantial provision of the GBL regulating the relationship between
different levels of government, the German Bundestreue may have the same binding
effect as the South African principles, i.e. imposing on the Bund or the Länder a
duty not to undermine the other‘s legitimate powers and functions.
DD) FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: TOWARDS A MORE EGALITARIAN PERSPECTIVE
As it was also predictable, the ANC considerably influenced the Bill of Rights
with his underlying egalitarian, interventionist ideology. Social and economic rights
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were much strengthened, resulting for example in detailed provisions guaranteeing
the right to housing (sec. 26), health care, food, water and social security (sec. 27),
rights of children such as family or parental care and basic nutrition, shelter, basic
health care services and social services (sec. 28) and the right to basic education
(sec. 29). The egalitarian influence may be seen in the following sections:
sec. 1 (a) declares the achievement of equality (my emphasis) a fundamental
value on which the state is founded;
sec. 8 (2) expressly guarantees horizontal application of the Bill of Rights
(when “applicable”) and may thus lead to a greater potential to affect private
relationships than under the IC (which is, however, contested by some experts
claiming that indirect horizontal application under the IC does not differ
substantially from direct horizontal application under the FC);
sec. 9 FC - the equality clause – by several reasons: Not only is the list of the
suspect classifications enlarged (which is not exhaustive, but discrimination on a
listed ground leads to a reversal of onus, i.e. once discrimination being established,
the justification has to be made by the alleged discriminator, sec. 9 (5) FC), but the
express horizontal application in sec. 9 (4) (“No person may discriminate...”, my
emphasis) also underlines the centrality of equality even in the private sphere. In
addition, the affirmative action clause changed from a “negative” to a “positive” or
inclusive formulation, which makes it clear that affirmative action is not to be seen
as an exception to the concept of equality, but as an interpretative guide to a
substantive notion of equality.
On the other hand, it was far from clear whether a private property clause
should be included in the FC. This may be astonishing, the right to private property
being a classical human right recognized in most democracies as well as in
international human rights documents. But you have to remember the considerable
left-wing trade unionist and communist influence in the ANC. What is seldom
known outside South Africa is that the ANC forms an alliance with the SACP
(South African Communist Party) und COSATU (Congress of South African Trade
Unions), with whom they present a joint list of candidates for the elections.
Therefore, 1/3 of all ANC MPs (and that means about 21-22 % in total) are
communists (comparing the 1994 and the 1999 elections, the figures do not differ
significantly).
Finally, the FC got their property clause already in the non-certified version,
but this was the result of harsh negotiations. In fact, inclusion of a property clause
was one of the latest questions decided before the above-mentioned deadline. It is
not exaggerated if a commentator writes that Sheila Camerer (a negotiator for the
NP) defended “her party’s position on the property clause until the last hours before
the constitution was approved by parliament.”
Therefore, the Constitution may not be labelled simply as “liberal” or
“egalitarian”, but egalitarian views therein have been strengthened.
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III. EVALUATION OF THE CONSTITUTION WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Sometimes you may have the impression that the more recent a constitutional
document is, the longer the text will be. So it is with the South African Constitution.
It is nevertheless clear that in spite of being sometimes labelled one of the best
Constitutions in the world, it cannot and should not contain solutions for any
problem in society. One example is how the Constitution deals with capital
punishment.
1. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
An example for a well-known problem in constitutional application is that the
courts are criticized for going too far in that they assume the role of the legislative
power when neglecting judicial self-restraint in constitutional interpretation. This
was exactly what happened in South Africa when, in one of the first CC
judgements, capital punishment was declared unconstitutional. As in South Africa,
there is a strong public support in favour of capital punishment, the negotiators of
the IC could not arrive at expressly abolishing ist, as did for example France in
1981, Germany in the GBL 1949 (Art. 102 simply reads: „Capital punishment shall
be abolished.“) or Spain in sec. 15 of the Spanish Constitution). But they included
a provision that „nor shall any person be subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment“ (sec. 11 (2) IC, similar to sec. 3 ECHR). So, the Court
was asked to state on whether capital punishment is „cruel, inhuman or degrading“.
In a unanimous judgement of principle, it answered in the affirmative. Although this
judgement was sometimes criticized because of the above-mentioned reasons, you
have to remember that the Court had no alternative and was obliged to decide on
the legality of capital punishment because the negotiating parties were not able to
do so. Therefore, the critics were sometimes unjustified. 
2. THE ROLE OF THE CC
A) CREATION
For some time, it was far from clear whether a Constitutional Court should be
established at all or whether the existing courts and especially the Supreme Court
of Appeal should decide in constitutional matters. Even today, some persons claim
the CC to be superfluous, but according to the most (and to myself as well), the
negotiators were right in establishing the CC. Without wanting to criticize the South
African Apartheid judiciary in an unqualified manner, it has nevertheless to be said
that in the period of transition, all existing judges have of course been nominated
by the apartheid regime and most of them made their judgements in conformity to
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the former ideology. Therefore, it was right not only to create a completely new
constitutional order, but also to strengthen this order by a newly created body called
for its protection and safeguard. The 11 judges were nominated by the President
after public interviews in which not only their judicial capacity, but also their
personal role in the apartheid regime was harshly examined. This may be criticized
as an extreme form of „political correctness“, but due to the historical
circumstances, it was in my opinion the best way to guarantee that the new order
would not be represented by those being involved in the support of the old one. 
The CC had an important role in constitutional application and interpretation,
especially in the first years after its creation. This phenomenon may be seen in other
recently established democracies as well: The first constitutional judgements are
often very long and detailed, deciding cases later called leading cases. In a society
deeply marked by apartheid ideology and jurisprudence and with no experience in
a human rights culture, the CC did its best to develop such a culture by developing
an indigenous human rights jurisprudence, sourced in both foreign and international
law as well as specific South African Circumstances. A good example for this is the
Court’s equality jurisprudence.
B) METHOD OF DECIDING CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: THE EQUALITY JURISPRUDENCE
In the equality analysis as developed by the CC, you may find some important
reference to Canadian constitutional law and especially one judgement of the
Supreme Court of Canada, namely Egan v. Canada. But the CC deliberately chose
to adopt the principles of a dissenting vote which already illustrates that it did not
uncritically copy the Canadian jurisprudence. Canadian Supreme Court Judge
L’Heureux-Dubé had a more substantive view on equality than the Court’s majority.
In determining whether there is „discrimination“ or, as it is called in South Africa,
„unfair discrimination“, one has to bear in mind that due to both historical and
societal discrimination, there are extreme patterns of inequality, prejudice and
stereotyping even in today‘s South Africa. The following extract from a CC leading
case (the same that has been quoted from before) makes clear that the CC does not
neglect the special circumstances in South Africa:
“The prohibition on unfair discrimination in the interim Constitution seeks not
only to avoid discrimination against people who are members of disadvantaged
groups. It seeks more than that. At the heart of the prohibition of unfair
discrimination lies a recognition that the purpose of our new constitutional and
democratic order is the establishment of a society in which all human beings will
be accorded equal dignity and respect regardless of their membership of particular
groups. The achievement of such a society in the context of our deeply inegalitarian
past will not be easy, but that that is the goal of the Constitution should not be
forgotten or overlooked.
...
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In order to determine whether the discriminatory provision has impacted on
complainants unfairly, various factors must be considered. These would include: 
(a) the position of the complainants in society and whether they have suffered
in the past from patterns of disadvantage, whether the discrimination in the case
under consideration is on a specified ground or not; 
(b) the nature of the provision or power and the purpose sought to be achieved
by it. If its purpose is manifestly not directed, in the first instance, at impairing the
complainants in the manner indicated above, but is aimed at achieving a worthy and
important societal goal, such as, for example, the furthering of equality for all, this
purpose may, depending on the facts of the particular case, have a significant
bearing on the question whether complainants have in fact suffered the impairment
in question. In Hugo, for example, the purpose of the Presidential Act was to benefit
three groups of prisoners, namely, disabled prisoners, young people and mothers of
young children, as an act of mercy. The fact that all these groups were regarded as
being particularly vulnerable in our society, and that in the case of the disabled and
the young mothers, they belonged to groups who had been victims of discrimination
in the past, weighed with the Court in concluding that the discrimination was not
unfair;
(c) with due regard to (a) and (b) above, and any other relevant factors, the
extent to which the discrimination has affected the rights or interests of
complainants and whether it has led to an impairment of their fundamental human
dignity or constitutes an impairment of a comparably serious nature.“
In Canada, L’Heureux-Dubé used a similar (substantive) approach in totally
different circumstances. It cannot be said that Canada has to come to grips with a
system based on inequality and the denial of fundamental rights to the majority of
the people. But according to L´Heureux-Dubé, the situation of homosexuals, the
group pretending to be discriminated against in the Egan case, was marked by
oppression and stigmatisation so that they were an extremely „vulnerable“ group
and that a law denying ... to them resulted in a denial of their human dignity and
constituted discrimination in terms of sec. 15 CCRF (Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms). In my opinion this example illustrates very well how the South
African CC manages to combine the experience of foreign jurisprudence with a
genuine adapting to a unique historical and societal situation, because they adapted
the principles of a minority judgement to a situation completely different from the
circumstances in the Egan case.
C) SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: THE SOOBRAMONEY CASE
As it has been said, the FC contains a number of socio-economic rights, i.e.
rights which are not simply “repressive” rights but which need positive state
intervention. On the other hand, the Constitution also contains classical liberal 1st
generation rights and it cannot be said that it entrenches a complete interventionist
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ideology in which the state is omnipresent and responsible for anything, thus
undermining private autonomy. In such a system, socio-economic rights may only
be guaranteed to a certain extent (an absolute “right to work” would only be
enforceable if the state was responsible for the organization of the economy, i.e. in
a marxist system leaving no place to private initiative). It was therefore interesting
to see how the CC would deal with such 2nd generation rights. 
The case Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal), CCT32/97 (27
November 1997) illustrates that the fears of those who had ideological reservations
on 2nd generation rights have not been justified.
The appellant was a diabetic who suffers from ischaemic heart disease and
cerebro-vascular disease. His kidneys failed in 1996 and his condition has been
diagnosed as irreversible. He asked to be admitted to the dialysis program of the
Addington Hospital (a state hospital). He was informed that he did not qualify for
admission. 
The CC finally had to consider whether Mr Soobramoney ought to receive
dialysis treatment at a state hospital in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution which entitle everyone to have access to health care services provided
by the state (s 27). The Court noted that the state has a constitutional obligation
within its available resources to provide health care, as well as sufficient food and
water and social security. The Court found, however, that the Department of Health
in KwaZulu-Natal does not have sufficient funds to cover the cost of services being
provided to the public. 
Thereby, large discretion was granted to the state in determining the
affordability of social grants.
3) CONCLUSION
Although it is beyond discussion that South Africa faces enormous problems,
it can be said that the Constitution is proof of an enormous effort to overcome a
deeply divided society and to advance a democratic culture and especially a respect
for human rights. I personally share the view that it is one of the best, at least one
of the most modern constitutions in the world and that it largely managed to benefit
from international and foreign experience. For those who adhere to a certain
political doctrine such as liberalism, egalitarianism, Marxism etc., the Constitution
may be too much an amalgam of various political and philosophical ideologies,
revealing its origin of compromise and thus lacking a clear line in certain issues. To
others, it may seem too “progressive” in the sense that it contains some guarantees
which are still far from being broadly accepted and have only been developed in
recent times. But this may also have a prospective effect on the international human
rights discussion and development. It may even be said that this has already taken
place. So much has been said on the influence of foreign constitutions and
international human rights instruments on the South African Constitution, but this
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has already transformed into a mutual influence. Take for example the right not to
be discriminated against because of the sexual orientation (sec. 9 [3] FC / sec. 8 [2]
IC), still being very controversial. Although there have been several judgements
considering sexual orientation as a prohibited ground for differentiation, there is, as
far as I know, not a single constitution except the south african expressly
mentioning sexual orientation as such a ground. But you will find a similar
provision in the recently proclaimed Charter of the EU (sec. 21)! My superior, Prof.
WEBER, has been told by Hungarian constitutional lawyers that they are very
interested in South African Constitutional Law and that they frequently refer to it in
their own judgements.
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